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Federal fiscal arrangements are argued to give rise to tacit collusion among competing 
Leviathans (Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, CUP, 1980). Though frequently 
encountered in academic and policy discussions, the cartelization hypothesis has rarely been 
scrutinized formally. This paper explores the effect of federal equalizing transfers on 
Leviathans engaged in tax competition. Contrary to the hypothesis, equalization is found to 
potentially complement tax competition in taming the Leviathan by implicitly taxing tax 
revenues extracted by the Leviathan. Thus, transfers might be an appropriate constitutional 
provision against fiscal expropriation. 
JEL classification: H7, H1, H20. 
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 1 Introduction
Economic integration constrains governments in designing their tax systems. The
enhanced option for economic resources (most notably physical capital) to locate in
more tax-favorable jurisdictions inclines politicians to reduce the tax burden oth-
erwise imposed on the resources. Though this aspect of integration appears to be
robust to whether governments are benevolent or use discretionary power to pursue
private agendas, the welfare implications of it critically depend on the politicians'
motivation. Following the public choice view, tax competition serves as a bene¯-
cial constitutional provision to tame a Leviathan-type government. The magni¯ed
tax base elasticity is argued to e®ectively constrain the Leviathan in expropriating
constituents (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977 and 1980).
To preserve the competitive pressure exerted by tax competition, the public
choice approach recommends a \loose" federal structure in which ¯scal ties between
competing jurisdictions are not too dominant. Most prominently advocated by
Brennan and Buchanan (1980, pp. 181-184), federal institutions designed to share
tax revenues between jurisdictions are to be opposed on the grounds that they
implicitly establish a cartel among competing Leviathans, undermining the boon of
decentralized taxation.1 Speci¯cally, Brennan and Buchanan conjecture that
\...the central government would act as an enforcer of the agreement
between governments, doling out ¯nancial penalties to those jurisdictions
which attempt to breach the agreement. ... If some state/province levied
a low rate of tax in relation to some instrument over which it retained
jurisdiction, other states would need to be able to penalize it by means
of its grant appropriation ..." (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 182).
One mode of intergovernmental revenue-sharing, which operates in almost all
federal economies, is that of ¯scal equalization programs. Their potential collusive
character derives from their inherent property to allocate resources to ¯scally-needy
1\Revenue sharing is undesirable, because it subverts the primary purpose of federalism which
is to create competition between jurisdictions."(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 183.)
2regions. If the system equates tax revenues across jurisdictions - as we assume in the
paper and as is the underlying principle for the equalization system among German
states - lowering the tax rate in an attempt to increase tax revenues tends to be pe-
nalized by grant appropriation. Following the drop in the tax rate, the region's own
mobile tax base improves, whereas tax revenues of neighboring regions deteriorate,
induced by a corresponding tax base out°ow. The equalization scheme responds
to the ¯scal imbalance by lower entitlements of the tax-lowering region and higher
entitlements of the other regions. Mirroring the Brennan-Buchanan hypothesis, the
revenue-sharing system appears to act as an enforcement mechanism of the tax car-
tel which o®sets the disciplining e®ect of tax competition. Accordingly, Leviathans
face less (or possibly even completely escape) competitive pressures at the expense
of constituents' welfare.
The paper formally addresses the Brennan-Buchanan cartelization hypothesis
for the class of revenue-sharing arrangements which equalize (per-capita) tax rev-
enues across regions. We assume Leviathan governments to be subject to capital
tax competition and interregional equalization at the same time. Two types of
Leviathans are considered: purely and partially sel¯sh politicians. While the former
view conforms to the canonical model of a surplus-maximizing government (Bren-
nan and Buchanan, 1980), the moderate view of politicians implicitly accounts for
disciplining political institutions as well.2 The paper's contribution is as follows:
In line with the ¯scal cartelization hypothesis, pure Leviathans generally collude
via equalizing transfers. Small regions are an exception; their taxing incentives are
found to be una®ected by transfers. If Leviathans are moderate, equalization may
even allow for bene¯cial e®ects judged from the constituents' perspective. Tax rev-
enue equalization programs impose an implicit tax on resources expropriated by the
Leviathan, thereby exerting further downward pressure on tax rates in addition to
tax competition. Interestingly, full equalization of public funds may even perfectly
tame the Leviathan's desire to divert resources. Thus, in contrast to the Brennan-
2For instance, a moderation of Leviathan behavior may be the result of democratic institutions
such as voting which at least partly force politicians to take constituents' well-being into account.
3Buchanan conjecture, ¯scal transfers cannot generally be excluded from the set of
e®ective checks and balances devices aimed at aligning Leviathans' and constituents'
interests. The diverging recommendation is rooted in the not too implausible as-
sumption that there is a tiny amount of benevolence in the government's motivation,
e.g. induced by democratic voting. The importance of explicit political constraints
is well recognized in Brennan and Buchanan (1980). But the incentive e®ects of
tax-revenue equalization programs in the presence of political constraints have not
completely been accounted for when formulating the conjecture.
The existing body of literature largely concentrates on analyzing tax competition
among Leviathan governments assuming away intergovernmental transfers; see e.g.
Epple and Zelenitz (1981), Edwards and Keen (1996), and more recently Gordon
and Wilson (2003). Epple and Zelenitz argue that tax competition cannot com-
pletely discipline the Leviathan. Additional political constraints are needed to curb
the tendency to overspend. Combining the benevolent and public choice view of
government, Edwards and Keen ¯nd tax competition to be welfare-enhancing, only
if the sel¯sh-part of the politicians' motivation is su±ciently pronounced.3 Gordon
and Wilson show that voters can partially mitigate the political agency problem by
choosing a tax mix in which property taxes play a major role. The rationale is that
the property tax base is responsive to the amount of socially-productive spending.
A tax mix favoring property taxes provides incentives to spend a larger fraction of
total tax revenues on productive expenditures instead of on \waste".
To the best of my knowledge the notion of ¯scal cartelization has so far received
little rigorous formal modelling. Exceptions are Flowers (1988), Wrede (1996, 2000)
and Keen (1998). They demonstrate that centralization of taxing powers and shar-
ing of all centrally-collected tax revenues might actually bene¯t constituents rather
than facilitate welfare-deteriorating collusion among Leviathans. Originating from
a tax base overlap, joint (i.e. centralized and decentralized) taxation takes the econ-
omy onto the downward-sloping side of the La®er-curve. The Leviathan and the
3See also Hange and Wellisch (1998). They demonstrate that some degree of decentralization
is bene¯cial as it reduces waste in government.
4constituents bene¯t from lower tax rates implemented by exclusively assigning tax-
ing powers to the central level. Equalizing transfers, however, make no appearance
in these papers.
The role of ¯scal equalization on resource allocation is well-established in the
literature on ¯scal federalism, but with a di®erent focus. As pioneered in Buchanan
(1952) and formalized in Boadway and Flatters (1982), tax revenue equalization
tends to eliminate ¯scally-induced migration incentives. While allowing one to as-
sess how equalization shapes the decisions of private agents, neither paper disen-
tangles the incentives imposed on government policy. Bucovetsky and Smart (2002)
and KÄ othenbÄ urger (2002) explicitly consider the interaction between equalization
and tax policy in the presence of tax competition. Unlike the present paper, they
assume benevolent governments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 char-
acterizes equilibrium Leviathan tax policy. The welfare implications are analyzed
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses extensions. Concluding remarks are o®ered in
Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Private Sector
Consider an economy with n > 1 identical regions each consisting of a representative
household and a representative ¯rm.4 Households derive utility from private con-
sumption, ci, i = 1;:::;n. In addition to the capital endowment, ~ k, each household
inelastically supplies one unit of labor, li = 1. Total income is, therefore, given by
the sum of the wage rate, wi, and the interest income, r~ k, yielding
c
i = w
i + r~ k: (1)
4With symmetric regions there is clearly no demand for equalization programs. The simpli¯-
cation has been however adopted to focus on a rationale for ¯scal equalization di®erent from the
reduction in regional ¯scal inequalities traditionally focused on.
5Regional ¯rms produce a num¶ eraire consumption good according to the neoclas-
sical production technology f(ki;li = 1) which exhibits constant returns to scale.
Firms maximize pro¯ts. Given a source-based capital tax, ti, the pro¯t-maximizing
input choices are characterized by wi = f(ki) ¡ f0(ki)ki and r + ti = f0(ki).5
Capital is perfectly mobile and is allocated across regions to equate the net return
on capital, r. The capital market equilibrium is thus characterized by the arbitrage
condition, r = f0(ki) ¡ ti, and the capital market clearing condition,
Pn
j=1 kj = ~ k.




















where the derivatives are evaluated at ki = k¡i.
2.2 Public Sector
Besides having their own tax revenues from levying a source-based capital tax at
a rate ti 2 [0;t], regions participate in a federally-mandated interregional transfer
system which is conditioned on all regions' tax rates.7 The transfer component
relevant for region i is given by ¯i(ti;t¡i), where t¡i is a vector of regional tax rates
except of region i's. Entitlement payments are determined so as to equalize tax
revenues among regions of the federation. This form of equalizing transfers is for















; ® 2 [0;1]: (3)
Transfers are conditioned on the di®erence between average and regional per-capita
tax revenues with parameter ® re°ecting the degree to which di®erences are equal-
ized. Note, since the transfer scheme is budget-balancing, i.e.
Pn
j=1 ¯j(¢) ´ 0, a
federal government ¯nancing the transfer scheme does not have to be introduced
explicitly. Its role is restricted to administer the equalization system.
5Subsequently, the ¯xed factor is omitted from notation. f0(ki) denotes the ¯rst derivative of
f(ki) with respect to ki. The second derivative is denoted by f00(ki).
6The superscript ¡i denotes a region other than region i.
7The upper bound t is introduced to rule out non-interior solutions inducing an in¯nite tax
rate.
63 Equilibrium Tax Policy
The regional government maximizes the weighted sum of private utility, consisting
of private consumption ci, and the surplus Si, comprising tax revenues and transfers,
Si := tiki + ¯i(ti;t¡i).8 Therefore,
t
¤i 2 argmaxti2[0;t] !c
i + S
i; ! ¸ 0:



















































Private consumption is unambiguously lowered by higher taxation. The impact
of a marginal tax increase on Si can be decomposed into three e®ects. Firstly, a
marginally higher tax rate translates into a change in a region's own tax revenues
(¯rst term in Eq. (5)). The transfer system's response is twofold. The second term in
Eq. (5) describes the impact of the induced change in average tax revenues on region
i's entitlement payments, while the last expression refers to the transfer response
following higher tax revenues in region i.
Rearranging terms allows for a useful alternative interpretation of the total ef-
fect. As shown in Eq. (6) higher tax revenues are implicitly taxed by the equalization





. The tax rate originates from the fact that marginally higher
tax revenues, tiki, decrease transfers at a rate ®, whereas the corresponding increase
in average tax revenues absorbs the drop in transfers at a rate ®
n. Intuitively, the
implicit tax e®ect intensi¯es the competitive pressure on Leviathan tax policy be-
yond the level already exerted by tax competition, since not only the tax base but
8The simpli¯ed objective function allows for a thorough analysis of the incentive e®ects imposed
by tax revenue equalization. The qualitative results carry over to more general objective functions;
see Section 5.
7also transfers shrink in response to taxation. The implicit tax e®ect of transfers is
counteracted by a collusion e®ect. Entitlement payments rise at a rate ®
n as tax rev-
enues of other regions, participating in the equalization scheme, increase; see second
term in Eq. (6). Ignoring this cross-budget e®ect is the basis for disciplining tax
competition, which is now partly overridden by ¯scal equalization. Consistent with
the Brennan-Buchanan cartelization hypothesis, this part of the transfer response
implicitly allows for collusive tax setting among Leviathans.
The magnitude of these e®ects depends on the degree of equalization ® and
the size of the federation n. While both e®ects are increasing in the degree of
equalization, scope for collusion is diminished whereas implicit taxation becomes
more pronounced as n rises. Therefore, decentralization (modelled as an increase in
n) strengthens the disciplining e®ect of transfers. Note, the disentangled impact of
a higher n on Si is exclusively mediated by the transfer response. The simultaneous
increase in the tax base elasticity, intensifying tax competition, does not explicitly
enter Eq. (6). It is captured by the tax base responses in Eq. (2).
3.1 Equilibrium Tax Policy without Transfers
To allow for a meaningful analysis of the cartelization hypothesis, we ¯rst charac-
terize tax policy in the absence of transfers, ¯i ´ 0, which subsequently serves as
a reference point. Using Eqs. (4) to (6) and rearranging, the optimal tax policy
follows from
²





ki; and ! 2 [0;1): (7)
The restriction ! < 1 guarantees an interior solution. We subsequently assume this
inequality to hold, implicitly re°ecting constitutional restrictions (if ! > 0) which
are insu±cient per-se to induce a zero tax rate. In a symmetric equilibrium, ki = ~ k.
Implied by Eq. (2), the higher the value of ²i, the higher the equilibrium tax rate.
Therefore, Eq. (7) establishes a negative relation between the tax rate and !. As !
lowers, the tax rate increases along the positively-sloping part of the La®er curve. In
particular, for ! = 0 the Leviathan reaches the maximum of the local La®er curve.
8In what follows, let t¤ (t¤
¯) denote the equilibrium tax rate without (with) trans-
fers. The positive relation between the tax base elasticity and the tax rate allows us
to interchangeably refer to the di®erence in ²i or to the tax di®erential t¤ ¡t¤
¯ when
evaluating the incentive e®ects of transfers in the next subsection.
3.2 Equilibrium Tax Policy with Transfers
In the canonical case of a pure Leviathan (! = 0) the ¯rst-order condition reads
²
i = 1 +
®
n(1 ¡ ®)
; ® 2 (0;1) (8)
for an interior solution. Proposition 1 reveals how transfers a®ect taxing incentives.9
Proposition 1: (Pure Leviathan) Let ! ´ 0. (i) In large open regions
(n 2 (1;1)) the Leviathan chooses t¤ < t¤
¯ · t, for ® 2 (0;1), and sets t¤
¯ = t for
® = 1. (ii) Conversely, if regions are small (n ! 1), tax policy is una®ected by
¯scal transfers irrespective of the degree of equalization ® 2 (0;1].
While tax competition in isolation takes the Leviathan to the peak of the re-
gional La®er curve, there is \overtaxation" of capital (²i > 1) if revenue equalization
is operative in a large open region (Eq.(8)).10 This is because the collusion e®ect
dominates the implicit tax e®ect. Fiscal transfers partially insulate the Leviathan
from capital mobility which encourages him to tax capital at a higher rate.11 In par-
ticular, with full equalization (® = 1) the collusive e®ect becomes su±ciently strong
9As demonstrated in the proof (see the Appendix), Proposition 1 adopts the tie-breaking rule
t¤ = t¤
¯ if n ! 1 and ® = 1. Otherwise, the equilibrium tax rate would not be uniquely determined.
10Paralleling ¯ndings with concurrent taxation in federal systems (e.g. Wrede (1996) and Keen
(1998)), Leviathan governments ¯nd themselves on the downward-sloping side of the locally-
perceived La®er-curve.
11To see the dominance of the collusion e®ect indirectly, divide the ¯rst-order condition @
@tiSi = 0






· 1. The modi¯ed optimality condition now decomposes into the
term @
@titiki, being set to zero in the absence of transfers, and a strictly positive collusion term






¸ 1. Equalizing-transfers unambiguously increase tax








, becomes unity for ® = 1. In this case, @
@tiSi = ki in equilibrium.
The Leviathan perceives the tax base to be inelastic. The transfer system therefore completely
insulates the budget from capital mobility.
9- [ )
t ¸ t¤
¯ > t¤ t¤ > t¤






n + 1 ¡ ® 1
Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 2 for ® 2 (0;1) and n 2 (1;1).
so as to completely o®set the disciplining constraints imposed by ¯scal competition.
Supporting the cartelization hypothesis, Leviathan monopoly power is fully regained
by transfers. In sum, with large open regions and pure Leviathans the equalization
system sustains a tax cartel, i.e. t¤
¯ > t¤. Any unilateral downward deviation in the
tax rate is punished by grant appropriation.
In a small open region ¯scal equalization, however, is neutral with respect to tax
policy contrasting the Brennan-Buchanan conjecture. In the absence of \political"
constraints (! ´ 0), the Leviathan chooses ²i = 1 both with and without transfers
(compare Eqs. (7) and (8)). The intuition for the neutrality result is that given by
Eq. (6) the collusion e®ect vanishes in a small open region. Since the implicit tax
rate is proportional to \before-tax" marginal tax revenues, @
@titiki, the latter is set to
zero in equilibrium. Taxing incentives are thus equivalent to those prevailing with
¯i(¢) ´ 0.
With the weight attached to the well-being of constituents being positive (mod-
erate Leviathan), the ¯rst-order condition becomes
²






; ® 2 (0;1) (9)
for an interior solution. The Leviathan's optimal tax policy is characterized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: (Moderate Leviathan) Let ! > 0 and ® 2 (0;1]. With large
and small open regions (n > 1) we have t¤
¯ T t¤ if and only if !n S 1 (with a possibly
binding upper tax rate constraint, t¤
¯ · t). In particular, for !n ¸ ® + n(1 ¡ ®),
t¤
¯ = 0.
10For ! > 0 the tax base elasticity might well drop below the value 1¡! prevailing
without transfers, but might also magnify possibly leading to \overtaxation" (²i >
1 > 1 ¡ !). The ambiguity arises since extracting one unit of tax revenues from
tax payers in°icts a cost of ! on the Leviathan. The cost has to be weighed against
the marginal e®ects on Si. With ! > 0, the implicit tax e®ect adds to the cost
of taxation from the perspective of the Leviathan, while the collusion e®ect lowers
it.12 In general, t¤
¯ < t¤ cannot be ruled out as an equilibrium outcome. In fact,
provided the economy is su±ciently decentralized, !n > 1, the implicit tax e®ect
dominates the collusion e®ect, which disciplines the Leviathan in its attempt to
extract resources. Moreover, the Leviathan's desire is completely checked by ¯scal
equalization (t¤
¯ = 0) if !n > ®+n(1¡®). Figure 1 illustrates the tax rate di®erential
t¤ ¡ t¤
¯ for varying values of ®;! and n. A higher degree of decentralization, n,
increases the potential for transfers to lower the tax rate below t¤. Similarly, a
higher equalization parameter ® widens scope for t¤
¯ = 0 by reducing the threshold
level at which t¤
¯ drops to zero.13
Proposition 2 implies:
Corollary: (Moderate Leviathan and Full Equalization) With a moder-
ate Leviathan and full equalization, the tax rate t¤
¯ is zero if the implicit tax e®ect
dominates the collusion e®ect (i.e. !n > 1). Consequently, in a small open economy
(n ! 1) the Leviathan is perfectly tamed, t¤ > t¤
¯ = 0.
In the presence of full equalization (® = 1), the implicit tax e®ect will become
su±ciently pronounced so as to yield a zero tax rate if !n > 1. For n ! 1,
12Formally, dividing the ¯rst-order condition ! @
@tici + @





, the collusion e®ect and the weight attached to the costs, incurred on constituents,
become more pronounced. Relative to the ¯rst-order condition without transfers, we have an
additional collusion term and a magni¯ed cost term. These countervailing e®ects give scope for
t¤
¯ < t¤, indicating a dominating implicit tax e®ect.
13In contrast, the threshold value at which t¤
¯ = t¤ is independent of ® since t¤ is only in°uenced
by n and !. Besides its e®ect on the upper threshold value, ® impacts the scale of the tax
di®erential t¤ ¡ t¤
¯ within each interval depicted in Figure 1. In particular, the magnitude of t¤
¯ is
positively in°uenced if n! < 1 and negatively if 1
n < ! < ®
n +1¡®. This ¯nding straightforwardly
deduces from Eq. (12) in the Appendix.
11the aforementioned condition is unambiguously satis¯ed which perfectly tames the
Leviathan for any slightly positive value of !. This is because the collusion e®ect
vanishes in a small open economy; see Eq. (6). The remaining implicit tax e®ect
induces an implicit tax rate approaching 100%. Traded o® against the cost of
taxation, ! @
@tici, it e®ectively eliminates incentives to divert resources.14
4 Welfare
Proposition 2 shows that for !n > 1 equalizing-transfers yield a lower equilibrium
tax rate (possibly being zero). Important for a welfare (constitutional) analysis,
this leaves the question as to whether lower tax rates unambiguously bene¯t the
taxpayer unaddressed. If the whole surplus is indeed consumed by the Leviathan,
as assumed so far, and the taxpayer's interest is only decisive at the constitutional
stage, the welfare implications are straightforward. Disciplining transfers tend to
align Leviathan's and constituents' interests since lower tax rates allow for a higher
level of private consumption. A constitutionally granted level of decentralization
and equalization as reported in the Corollary induces such an alignment of inter-
ests. The welfare prescriptions will be less straightforward if one assumes that the
constitution is not exclusively designed to express the taxpayers' preference as gener-
ally assumed (e.g. Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). Under the veil of ignorance each
voter anticipates that with a positive probability he will be picked as a member
of the \Leviathan group" at the post-constitutional level (West and Corke, 1980).
Unless the probability becomes negligible, the constitutional choice will re°ect the
Leviathans' interest as well. In this case, the constitutionally preferred size of the
public budget, subsequently denoted by S¤, will be positive.15
This raises the issue of whether constitutional provisions concerning ® may alle-
viate the welfare loss or may even induce the socially preferred outcome.
14Note, following Eq. (6) the implicit tax rate ®n¡1
n ! 1 for ® = 1 and n ! 1.
15Even with a negligible probability, a positive value of S¤ will be preferred at the constitutional
level if a fraction of tax revenues is used to ¯nance public goods which are valued by the taxpayer;










Figure 2: Equilibrium tax rate with !n > 1 and ! 2 (0;1).
Proposition 3: (Optimal Equalization Scheme) If the federal system is
su±ciently decentralized such that !n > 1, then for any value of S¤, smaller than
the size of the budget in the absence of transfers, a level of equalization ®¤ yielding
S¤ exists.
From a constitutional perspective this proposition has a straightforward implica-
tion. The preferred policy outcome can be implemented if the constitution prescribes
a degree of decentralization satisfying !n > 1 and a level of equalization ®¤. Be-
ing appropriately exposed to capital mobility and ¯scal equalization, the Leviathan
faces correct taxing incentives. The chosen policy outcome coincides with S¤.
One may wonder whether it isn't feasible to achieve the same outcome with tax
competition in isolation. Figure 2 illustrates the tax rate as a function of ® for
regions which are large (upper curve) and small (lower curve), respectively, relative
to the rest of the federation.16 Setting ® = 0 yields the outcome under tax competi-
tion. Observe, even when exhausting the \gains" from decentralization by selecting
16The proof to Proposition 3 contains the derivation of the closed-form solution for the equilib-
rium tax rate t¤
¯ depicted in Figure 2.
13n ! 1, the equilibrium tax rate, t¤, is strictly positive.17 Introducing equalizing
grants allows for magni¯ed pressure which can even reduce the tax rate to zero (for
® 2 [~ ®;1)).18
5 Extension
So far, we have resorted to the canonical model of surplus-maximizing governments
adhered to in Brennan and Buchanan (1980). Politicians extract the highest possible
amount of resources from the public sector in order to ¯nance \wasteful" consump-
tion. Before turning to alternative objective functions, it is useful to highlight that
the fundamental equation (4), which separates the incentive e®ects of tax revenue
equalization, holds independently of the politicians' motivation. Therefore, the im-
plicit tax e®ect and the collusion e®ect may become su±ciently strong or weak
depending on the constitutionally chosen levels of ® and n.
A class of Leviathan models, which has recently received attention, integrate
the public ¯nance and public choice view of government. For instance, Edwards
and Keen (1996) and Sato (2003) employ a more general model of tax competition
among moderate Leviathans than presented in the previous section. Edwards and
Keen allow politicians to spend an endogenously determined fraction of the budget
on socially-valuable public services and \waste". Besides introducing public good
provision, Sato explicitly models rent-seeking as the source of political failure.
In both cases, adding equalizing-transfers, for which the implicit tax e®ect dom-
inates, would increase the marginal cost of public funds. Transfers now impact
welfare twofoldly. They still correct for political distortions (e.g. the reduction of
\waste" in Edwards and Keen or of rent-seeking activities in Sato), but also ag-
gravate the ine±ciency in public good provision. Note, since political ine±ciencies
17Letting n ! 1 increases the tax base response in absolute terms but it is still ¯nite; see
Eq. (2).
18The degree of equalization at which the tax rate becomes zero reads ~ ® :=
(1¡!)n
n¡1 2 (0;1). It
becomes 1 ¡ ! in a small open economy; see the proof to Proposition 3.
14represent the price the taxpayer has to pay for partially-sel¯sh politicians to provide
public goods, it is optimal from the taxpayer's point of view to leave some rents
to politicians. The second-best size of the budget, S¤, is generally strictly positive.
In these hybrid models transfers continue to be desirable from a constitutional per-
spective if decentralization (higher n) alone is insu±cient to implement the preferred
policy outcome, S¤.19 Fiscal equalization might still be an appropriate institution
to limit the size of the budget.
6 Concluding Remarks
The paper takes the ¯scal cartelization hypothesis to a formal analysis. While the
Brennan-Buchanan view predicts that bene¯ciary tax competition will be under-
mined by transfers, the present analysis arrives at an ambiguous e®ect if transfers
are set so as to equalize tax revenues. Equalizing transfers can potentially limit the
expropriation of constituents adding to the protective e®ect of ¯scal competition.
The result critically depends on the size of the implicit tax e®ect and the collu-
sion e®ect inherent in the transfer formula. Evaluating the incentive e®ects of the
tax revenue equalization scheme implemented among German states, Baretti et al.
(2002) estimate implicit tax rates ranging from 70% to 95% (depending on state
size). Lending some empirical support against the Brennan-Buchanan conjecture,
these tax rates are su±ciently high to severely constrain tax policy. However, as
shown in the present paper, the overall incentive e®ect cannot be deduced based on
these ¯ndings. Complementary estimates of the collusion e®ect are needed to ¯rmly
assess the cartelization hypothesis - an avenue for future empirical research.
The result crucially depends on the design of the equalization formula. A dif-
ferent type of equalization program frequently in place is guided by the notion of
a representative tax system. Entitlement payments are responsive to di®erences
in the taxing capacity (using standardized tax rates) rather than actual per-capita
19The potential insu±ciency of decentralization to appropriately tame the Leviathan might also
derive from the fact that the drawing of regional boundaries is subject to so far neglected geo-
graphical or ethnical constraints. They apply less when choosing ®.
15tax revenues. Unlike tax-revenue equalization considered in the paper, this transfer
scheme performs consistently with the notion of cartelization (see Bucovetsky and
Smart, 2002 and KÄ othenbÄ urger, 2002).20 A higher level of taxation depresses the
tax base (taxing capacity) relative to the standard which unambiguously lures ad-
ditional transfers to the tax-raising region. The improved taxing incentives at least
partly undo the discipline of competitive federalism. Grossman and West (1994) ¯nd
empirical evidence for the collusive character of this type of equalization scheme in
Canada where it has gradually been adopted over the second half of the 20th cen-
tury. Over the same time span, provincial taxing powers have partially been given
up to the central government, whereas the collusion-enhancing equalization system
has been used to refund centrally-collected tax revenues to provinces. Consistent
with the Brennan-Buchanan conjecture, higher federal transfers as a share of provin-
cial and local governments receipts went along with a larger share of government
expenditure in the GNP at lower levels of government.
To conclude, the paper suggests that if sel¯sh politicians and bureaucrats expand
the public budget beyond its \optimal" size, equalizing transfers might serve as an
e®ective constitutional constraint on taxing powers - a bene¯cial e®ect previously
unnoticed.




; ® 2 [0;1]; (10)
where t and k denote the representative tax rate and tax base, respectively. Taking both as
parameters of the formula, a marginally higher tax rate raises transfer payments, i.e. @
@ti¯i(¢) =
¡®t @
@tiki > 0. Although the results in Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) and KÄ othenbÄ urger (2002)
are derived for benevolent governments, the e®ect prevails independently of the government's
motivation.
16A Appendix
Helpful in all subsequent proofs, we ¯rst derive the ¯rst-order condition of the
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~ k T 0; ! 2 [0;1): (11)
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume ! ´ 0. (i) Let n 2 (1;1) . For ® 2 (0;1) there is always a non-zero tax rate
satisfying Eq. (11) as an equality. Rewriting the ¯rst-order condition, the interior
solution follows from ²i = 1 + ®
n(1¡®). Comparing with Eq. (7) reveals t¤ < t¤
¯. To
cover for the possibility of ti · t being binding, we have t¤ < t¤
¯ · t. For ® = 1, the
term in Eq. (11) becomes strictly positive. Thus, t¤
¯ = t.
(ii) If n ! 1, Eq. (11) reads ¡(1 ¡ ®)(²i ¡ 1). An interior solution exists for
® 2 (0;1) which coincides with the solution to Eq. (7). Thus, t¤ = t¤
¯. In the case of
full equalization, ® = 1, the optimal tax rate is undetermined. In fact, any value of
ti 2 [0;t] can be sustained as an equilibrium tax rate. To resolve the indeterminacy,
we adopt the tie-breaking rule t¤ = t¤
¯ if ® = 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume ! > 0. Let n > 1. Given by the non-negativity constraint on ti Eq. (11)
cannot hold as an equality if !n ¸ ® + n(1 ¡ ®). In this case Eq. (11) becomes
unambiguously negative yielding t¤
¯ = 0. Conversely, if !n < ®+n(1¡®), existence
of a non-zero tax rate satisfying Eq. (11) as an equality is guaranteed.
If ® 2 (0;1) the corresponding ¯rst-order condition reads ²i = 1 + ®
n(1¡®) ¡ !
1¡®.
Comparing with Eq. (7) and rearranging gives ! S 1
n , t¤
¯ T t¤. A possibly binding
upper constraint ti · t is re°ected by t¤
¯ · t.








t¤ if ! = 1
n;
0 >
which follows from inserting ® = 1 in Eq. (11). Note, for ! = 1
n the optimal tax
rate is undetermined. In this case we adopt the tie-breaking rule t¤ = t¤
¯. Thus,
t¤
¯ T t¤ , ! S 1
n. Finally, note that !n ¸ ® + n(1 ¡ ®) implies ! > 1
n for n > 1.
Combining all results proves Proposition 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Given by Proposition 2 Eq. (11) is satis¯ed as an equality if !n < ®+n(1¡®). Thus,
the non-negativity constraint on ti becomes binding for ® > ~ ® where ~ ® :=
(1¡!)n
n¡1 .

















Following Proposition 2 t¤ > t¤
¯ if !n > 1. Under this condition the tax rate
exhibits two important properties. Firstly, observe that the equilibrium tax rate is
continuous and strictly decreasing in ® 2 (0; ~ ®) and equal to zero for ® 2 [~ ®;1),
where ~ ® 2 (0;1) since ! 2 (0;1). Secondly, t¤
¯ ! t¤ if ® ! 0. Thus, if t¤~ k > S¤,
the intermediate value theorem guarantees an equalization parameter ®¤ 2 (0; ~ ®)
for a positive value of S¤ such that t¤
¯~ k = S¤. If S¤ = 0, any equalization parameter
®¤ 2 [~ ®;1) implements the preferred allocation which completes the proof.
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